Hamas' Near-Term Strategy - What Next?

On Friday, June 15, 2007, Hamas triumphantly proclaimed its victory in the Gaza Strip. ''We are telling our people that the past era has ended and will not return," Hamas spokesman Islam Shahwan declared. With the Gaza Strip now under the rule of Hamas, the issue arises as to whether Hamas will be able to rapidly transform its Gaza victory into sweeping gains for its movement beyond the boundaries of that area. Odds are much against such an outcome in the near-term.

Hamas is not in a strong position to "break out" of the international embargo arrayed against it. It currently lacks both widespread global legitimacy and the military capacity to intensify its "war" against Israel. It has gained the Gaza Strip, but at the risk of losing its influence over the future evolution of the larger Palestinian issue. Consequently, it will seek to consolidate its position in the Gaza Strip, pursue a gradual "bottom-up" approach toward Islamic rule in the Gaza Strip, undermine the new Palestinian government in the West Bank, and ease outside pressure on its organization.

At present, Hamas is too weak to inflict substantial harm on Israel, much less pose an existential threat to that country. In addition, fresh from its indecisive outcome in Lebanon, Israel would almost certainly err on the side of overestimating the amount of force necessary to prevail in the Gaza Strip, so as to avoid another outcome that could fatally imperil its doctrine of deterrence in a regional "neighborhood" that is growing increasingly tougher with Iran's rising power and spreading instability. Hamas also understands that Israel largely succeeded in suppressing the intifada of suicide bomb attacks from the measures and tactics Israel implemented against the terrorists. Hence it is very unlikely that Hamas will risk "overplaying" its hand against Israel in the near-term, even if Iran tries to tempt it in that direction. Instead, Hamas will likely continue to launch periodic rocket attacks and other small-scale terrorist activity against Israel to demonstrate that it maintains its fight against Israel. However, it likely will not dramatically increase the magnitude or frequency of such attacks to the extent that it would provoke a major Israeli military response. In addition, it could well renew its conditional offers for a ceasefire with Israel to try to "buy time" to strengthen its hold over the Gaza Strip, especially if Fatah and/or the international community strengthen their efforts to isolate Hamas.

These realities will likely constrain Hamas through the near- and, possibly, the medium-term, as well. As a result, Hamas is likely to pursue a limited agenda. That agenda will be comprised of four major elements:

o Consolidating of its Rule in the Gaza Strip: Hamas will seek to solidify its hold over the Gaza Strip. This will entail such measures as placing all major armed groups under its authority, enticing opponents to join its cause through offers of amnesty and perhaps political patronage, and suppressing, sometimes violently, those who maintain their opposition. Even as it tries to strengthen its rule over the Gaza Strip, Hamas will attempt to downplay the Gaza Strip's separation from the West Bank so as to maintain is posture of supporting a single Arab state over the entire Palestine region. Hence, it will continue to assert its willingness to cooperate with the West Bank and express a desire to enter into a dialogue with Fatah. Hamas also needs relative calm with Israel to consolidate its grip over the Gaza Strip. Toward that end, Hamas may renew its offer of a ceasefire with Israel, but the terms of such an offer would fall far short of a path that would lead toward Hamas' recognition of Israel or a more permanent peace. Hamas will not likely abandon its objective of seeking to eliminate Israel in the future.

o Incremental Islamization: Hamas seeks to create a single Islamic state in the historic Palestine region. At present, it likely lacks the ability to impose such a state in the Gaza Strip through decree. At the same time, it desires to present itself to the world as a "moderate" force, and the imposition of Islamic rule would undermine that effort. As a result, Hamas will likely seek to build an Islamic state from the "bottom up." Education would constitute a logical starting point for such an effort. Hamas has emphasized the control of education for pursuing its objectives. The Hamas Charter states, "It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of awakening (the masses)... It is necessary to follow Islamic orientation in educating the Islamic generations in our region by teaching the religious duties, comprehensive study of the Koran, the study of the Prophet's Sunna (his sayings and doings), and learning about Islamic history and heritage from their authentic sources." The Turkish Daily News recently reported, "During a year in power, the Islamic Hamas movement has begun taking control of Palestinian schools and is making changes... In some cases, girls are pushed by pro-Hamas teachers to pray and wear headscarves, although no law requires it." That trend will likely continue.

o Undermining the Legitimacy of the New Palestinian Government: Hamas will likely attempt to delegitimize the new West Bank-based Palestinian government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. To do so, Hamas will assert that this new government is both unconstitutional and undemocratic. Any diplomacy by President Abbas or Prime Minister Fayyad with Israel, the United States, or other members of the international community will likely be dismissed as "collusion."

o Impairing the Performance of the New Palestinian Government: Hamas has a presence in the West Bank, albeit a smaller one than in the Gaza Strip. It will likely attempt to thwart the new Palestinian government's ability to function via terrorist attacks or assassinations aimed at intimidating the new government's personnel, undermining the possibility of Israel's loosening security restrictions, and blocking the new Palestinian government's ability to proceed along the diplomatic path. If Hamas can render the new Palestinian government ineffective, economic growth and improved standards of living would remain elusive in the West Bank. If Hamas can pin down the new Palestinian government with violence in the West Bank, it can limit that government's ability to regain control over the Gaza Strip. If Hamas can prevent Israel from loosening security restrictions in the West Bank, prospects for the West Bank's ability to evolve toward a free and stable state would be reduced. If Hamas can prevent the new Palestinian leadership from making diplomatic progress with Israel, then the historic Palestinian-Israeli dispute would be perpetuated. Such outcomes would lead to an erosion of popular support for the new Palestinian government and would put Hamas in a position to "wait out" its tenure.
Hamas' bid to delegitimize the new Palestinian government is likely to pose the most serious early threat, so a closer look at its arguments is in order. In advancing its claim, Hamas will likely argue that President Abbas exceeded his constitutional authority in firing Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas and appointing a new Prime Minister. A careful reading of the Palestinian Basic Law or Constitution reveals that this is a weak case even if the rhetoric is impressive.

Article 45 of the Palestinian Constitution grants the President authority to fire the Prime Minister. Article 43 gives the President the ability to issue binding decrees in "exceptional cases" when the legislature is not in session. President Abbas used such authority to fire Prime Minister Haniyeh and appoint Salam Fayyad as his replacement.

The more treacherous part may come later. President Abbas' decrees have force of law so long as the Palestinian legislature is not in session. However, once the legislature is convened, those decrees must be presented to the legislature for approval and, if not presented or approved, they lose power of authority. Hamas holds a majority in the legislature. Nonetheless, such a majority does not present an insurmountable problem.

Under Article 74 of the Constitution, Hamas could attempt to convene the legislature to overturn Abbas' decrees (particularly those that have outlawed its armed wing) and attempt to remove or rein in Prime Minister Fayyad. With Israel having previously detained a number of Hamas legislators and Fatah having abandoned the legislature, it is uncertain whether Hamas could put together a quorum so as to convene the legislature.

Even if Hamas were to find a quorum, Article 77 requires an absolute majority of the legislature to topple the government via a no confidence. It is not possible at this time for Hamas to forge an absolute majority of legislators.

Even in the unlikely event that Hamas were able to muster an absolute majority, it would not be able to impose its will through the legislature. Article 86 of the Constitution requires that the "conditions" of employment of all appointed public officials and staff be "in accordance to the law." While the legislators were elected, as opposed to appointed, it is general practice in democratic societies to hold all members of government accountable under the law. Hence, President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad could cite Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip as having put that organization and its members in violation of the law, which would render their legislative role irrelevant.

This will leave Hamas to try to portray the Abbas-Fayyad government as violating the democratic will of the Palestinian people. Hamas will argue that its members were elected as a majority and, therefore, Abbas and Fayyad have taken steps that run counter to the will of the Palestinian majority. Abbas and Fayyad can counter that while Hamas' representatives had been elected to serve the Palestinian public, they did not receive a popular mandate to seize the Gaza Strip in an armed operation. At the same time, given Hamas' armed control of the Gaza Strip, Abbas and Fayyad could successfully argue that the situation there is not conducive for free and fair elections.

In the end, on account of a combination of its relative weakness, the heavy demands associated with governing a poverty-stricken and dysfunctional territory, a continuing international economic embargo on the Gaza Strip even as the West Bank is poised to receive financial and technical assistance from around the world, and possible diplomatic moves by Israel and the international community to advance the peace process with the West Bank's more pragmatic leadership, Hamas will likely try to delegitimize the Palestinian government headed by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. At the same time, it could increasingly seek to return to a situation that would resemble the status quo ante Hamas shattered with its seizure of the Gaza Strip. Such moves would be designed solely to ease the pressure on Hamas that resulted from that development that, if not mitigated, could reverse its gains in the Gaza Strip and undercut its ability to pursue its longer-term objectives. Those tactics, regardless of how they are positioned, are not likely to represent a moderation of Hamas' radical ideology and aims. Hamas' long-term goal will very likely remain Israel's elimination, even if Hamas attempts to enter into a temporary ceasefire or de facto relationship with Israel in the near-term to facilitate its position in the Gaza Strip.

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.

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