The latest round of violence between Hamas and Fatah signal the
need for diplomats to consider decoupling the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
With Hamas battling Fatah for control of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian
territories could well be on the way toward splitting into a largely
secular West Bank and Islamist Gaza Strip. Even if a temporary truce is
reached between the two warring parties, and the shelf-life of such
truces has proved short, the fundamental ideological differences that
divide the two Palestinian territories will persist. Such differing
worldviews will have a potentially major impact on the larger
Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
From their starkly contrasting
vantage points, the West Bank's leaders will continue to view their
dispute with Israel as a political matter. The Gaza Strip's Islamists
will see the dispute in terms of religious obligation. The West Bank's
leaders will seek political settlement to bring about a better future.
The Gaza Strip's leaders will seek only total victory. Consequently,
negotiations with the West Bank's leaders would be the "art of the
possible," while any talks with the Gaza Strip's leadership would be the
"art of the impossible." Given this reality, international and regional
diplomats should seriously examine treating the historic
Israel-Palestinian dispute, not as a single matter subject to a grand,
if not idealistic, final settlement at some time in the future, but as
two separate disputes: one between Israel and the West Bank, and the
other between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Then, the diplomatic process
could proceed on a more realistic path that focuses on achieving
progress where it is possible, while limiting the spread of violence
from areas where progress is not feasible.
Even if the latest
round of fighting wanes, the disparate political dynamics that govern
the West Bank and Gaza Strip have already created a de facto two-entity
reality. Furthermore, no matter the outcome of the latest round of
Hamas-Fatah combat, the ideological differences that separate the two
areas are likely to grow with the passage of time. In turn, the de facto
two-entity reality will only harden, making diplomacy that ignores this
reality even more futile.
The ideological differences between
Fatah and Hamas are unbridgeable. Fatah's position, as expressed in the
1993 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement is that it is
"time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize
their [Israelis' and Palestinians'] mutual legitimate and political
rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity
and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political
process." Even as Yasser Arafat ultimately proved unwilling to reach a
historic final settlement, Fatah had staked out a position that allowed
for mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence.
Hamas, on the
other hand, embraces a radical triumphalist approach. Hamas rejects
Israel's right to exist and seeks only its destruction. Furthermore,
Hamas defines its rejectionism as a matter of religious obligation. The
Hamas Charter declares, "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that
the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem
generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be
squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a
single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or
president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization
nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do
that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem
generations until Judgment Day." The Charter also proclaims,
"Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international
conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic
Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed
against part of religion."
A diplomatic formula that ignores the
irreconcilable differences that currently divide the predominantly
Fatah-led West Bank and Hamas-run Gaza Strip has very little chance to
succeed. Failure to consider the emerging two-entity reality will only
thwart the possibility of diplomatic success, limit the possibility of
containing the spread of violence from the Gaza Strip, and provide time
for radical Islamists to accumulate power in the West Bank. A new
approach that seeks to consolidate gains made in the West Bank from past
diplomatic accords and then incrementally advance the West Bank along a
political horizon toward full-fledged sovereignty, coupled with a tough
approach that erects a "firewall" around the radical Islamist
"statelet" that is emerging in the Gaza Strip holds the most realistic
prospect of promoting stability and advancing political reconciliation.
Such a two-track approach would leverage the West Bank's leaders'
relative pragmatism to reach negotiated agreements, allow the
pragmatists to strengthen their standing from diplomatic achievements,
and provide mechanisms by which the West Bank could develop a viable and
sustainable economy and functioning political and legal institutions
necessary for full sovereignty. An approach that seals off the Gaza
Strip to all but humanitarian assistance would insulate surrounding
areas from the spread of the kind of violence and radicalism that
currently plague the Gaza Strip.
Some might argue that such an
approach would lead Gaza toward "state failure." However, it is already a
failed "statelet." Hamas' illiberal domination of that area has
suffocated investment flows, barred economic development, and made the
rule of law all but impossible. Violence is widespread, legal authority
is practically non-existent, and 63% of the Gaza Strip's residents live
in poverty.
Others might assert that such an approach would
require Israel to invade the Gaza Strip. They would warn that such an
approach would lead to the kind of insurgency that bedeviled Israeli
forces in Lebanon and currently hinders U.S. forces in Iraq. They would
also caution that beyond the Gaza Strip, Israel's invasion of that area
would give new fuel to regional and global radical Islamist movements.
Those arguments are actually irrelevant. Containment of the Gaza Strip
does not require an Israeli invasion. It entails sealing off that area's
borders and waters. Egypt and Israel both have the means and the
national security interests to do so. Both are eager to curtail the
spread of instability from the Gaza Strip. Both are concerned about
growing Iranian influence over Hamas. Therefore, they have genuine
reason to work together to safeguard their common interests.
Nevertheless,
even as the Gaza Strip is sealed off, the diplomatic process should
leave available an avenue by which the Gaza Strip could later have a
chance to rejoin the larger negotiating process or eventually be
absorbed into an increasingly sovereign West Bank, perhaps modeled after
West Germany's absorption of East Germany at the end of the Cold War.
There
would be the possibility that visible political and economic progress
in the West Bank could eventually inspire a new pragmatic leadership to
gain sufficient popular support within the Gaza Strip to topple Hamas,
whose rule would bring only hardship and economic misery for the
isolated territory. Smart diplomacy always leaves openings to seize upon
positive developments that might occur. A process that decouples the
West Bank and Gaza Strip should be no different.
To bring about
such a process, the Madrid Quartet (United Nations, European Union,
Russia and the United States) should negotiate quietly behind the scenes
with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and/or other Palestinian
leaders who embrace the Madrid Quartet's basic principles to secure
their consent for the two-track approach. As noted above, such an
approach could be temporary e.g., an avenue for returning to a joint
framework would be left open.
In the end, if there is a
silver-lining to the current Hamas-Fatah fighting, it is that this
conflict has put into the open the reality that the West Bank and Gaza
Strip are truly two distinct entities. A diplomatic approach that
embraces this reality, offers perhaps the best chance to unfreeze the
status quo that benefits none of the parties. If the new approach can
achieve progress in the West Bank and contain the spread of instability
from the Gaza Strip, the seeds for a new regional architecture that
would be more conducive to political reconciliation could be planted. At
a time when chaos reigns in an increasingly sectarian Iraq, possible
ethnic conflict simmers in Lebanon, and Iran continues its rise toward
possible regional hegemony, the potential benefits from decoupling the
West Bank and Gaza Strip are made even more attractive than they would
otherwise be.
Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues.
No comments:
Post a Comment